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I. INTRODUCTION
Parents wait anxiously while their two-month-old daughter undergoes routine
hernia surgery.' During the surgery, the doctor discovers that their child has
undescended testes in her stomach, and not the expected female reproductive
organs.2 With the infant still on the operating table and under anesthesia, the
doctor exits the surgery and requests that the parents give their consent to remove
the testes. Can the parents consent to a surgery that substantially affects the
child's adulthood? Would the child's testes allow her to be fertile in a
traditionally masculine sense despite her outwardly feminine appearance? Could
she be fertile today or in the future with medical advances?
The situation is even more complicated when a child is clearly fertile.
Consider a fifteen-year-old male who is experiencing menstrual bleeding through
his penis.' The parents have known for some time that he has a uterus and
ovaries, but no testes.4 However, in hopes of preserving his "male" self-image,
the parents have not disclosed this information to the teen. Now, they want the
doctor to perform a hysterectomy6 while keeping the purpose of the surgery
secret from the patient. Although the teenage male is currently fertile, he would
need medical intervention for fertilization and delivery in the future. In other
words, this hysterectomy would sterilize him.
1. While based on real cases, this situation was generalized by Anne Tamar-Mattis in Exploring Gray
Areas in the Law About DSD and Sterilization: Legal Rules About Parental Consent Are Different when
Fertility Is on the Line, ENDOCRINE TODAY, Oct. 1, 2009, http://www.endocrinetoday.com/view.aspx?
rid=44415 [hereinafter Exploring Gray Areas] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
2. Id.
3. Tamar-Mattis, Exploring Gray Areas, supra note 1.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. A hysterectomy removes the uterus, but may additionally remove the cervix. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL
DICTIONARY (27th ed. 2000).
7. Exploring Gray Areas, supra note 1.
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Both of these children have differences of sex development (DSDs). DSDs
are conditions that involve atypical "male" and "female" physical
characteristics,9 but that definition depends on who is doing the defining.'
Scholars estimate that one in 1500 children are born with a DSD of some kind,
the obviousness of which may range from those not evident to an untrained
observer to a completely indeterminate sex based on physical observation." In
fact, some intersex individuals may have conditions so subtle that they may never
know they are intersex.12 One method of determining sex-as opposed to
gender-depends on three physical characteristics: (1) the sex chromosome
configuration, 3  (2) the internal reproductive organs, and (3) the external
reproductive organs.14  An inconsistency between one or more of these
characteristics is a DSD. As a practical matter, however, sex is normally
determined by a glance at the external genitalia immediately after birth. When
the birth attendant is uncertain based on that glance, doctors analyze the various
characteristics of the child to make a diagnosis, and then they assign a sex based
on the likeliest outcome of that diagnosis." The traditional standard of care for
8. These conditions are also referred to as "intersex" or "disorders of sex development." The
nomenclature issue is contentious and emotional. The author has attempted to follow a middle path by using the
alternative meaning for DSD, "differences of sex development," to describe intersex conditions, while using
"intersex" to refer to individuals with these conditions.
9. DSDs are physical conditions, which means that individuals with DSDs may be straight, gay,
bisexual, transgender, or transsexual. INTERSEX SOCIETY OF NORTH AMERICA, HANDBOOK FOR PARENTS 15
(2006), available at http://www.dsdguidelines.org/ ("Although most women are attracted to men, and most men
are attracted to women, knowing a person's sex or gender won't tell you his or her sexual orientation.").
10. ALICE DOMURAT DREGER, HASTINGS CENTER, "AMBIGUOUS SEX"--OR AMBIVALENT MEDICINE?
ETHICAL ISSUES IN THE TREATMENT OF INTERSEXUALITY 26 (May-June 1998) ("One quickly runs into a
problem, however, when trying to define 'key' or 'essential' feminine and masculine anatomy.").
11. See Intersex Society of North America, How Common Is Intersex?, http://www.isna.org/
faq/frequency (last visited Mar. 29, 2010) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) ("If you ask experts at
medical centers how often a child is born so noticeably atypical in terms of genitalia that a specialist in sex
differentiation is called in, the number comes out to about I in 1500 to I in 2000 births. But a lot more people
than that are born with subtler forms of sex anatomy variations, some of which won't show up until later in
life."); DREGER, supra note 10, at 26 ("I am persuaded by more recent, well-documented literature that
estimates the number to be roughly I in 1,500 live births. The frequency estimate goes up dramatically,
however, if we include all children born with what some physicians consider cosmetically 'unacceptable'
genitalia.").
12. Intersex Society of North America, What Is Intersex?, http://www.isna.org/faq/what isjintersex (last
visited Jan. 24, 2011) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) ("Though we speak of intersex as an inborn
condition, intersex anatomy doesn't always show up at birth. Sometimes a person isn't found to have intersex
anatomy until she or he reaches the age of puberty, or finds himself an infertile adult, or dies of old age and is
autopsied. Some people live and die with intersex anatomy without anyone (including themselves) ever
knowing.").
13. While most people understand the terms XX and XY, many varieties exist, including XXY, forty-six
XY, forty-seven XXY, XY female, XO, XYY, and mosaicism (i.e., some cells are XX and some cells are XY).
Melanie Blackless et al., How Sexually Dimorphic Are We?, 12 AM. J. HUM. BIOLOGY 151, 152 (2000).
14. Id.
15. Interview with Anne Tamar-Mattis, Director, Advocates for Informed Choice (Oct. 14, 2010) (on
file with the McGeorge Law Review).
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the treatment of DSDs often involves the removal of external and/or internal
reproductive organs.'" External reproductive organs are primarily removed or
altered to make the child's physical appearance similar to a standardized version
of the child's assigned gender. Doctors primarily remove internal reproductive
organs to prevent hormone production 7 that might create bodily changes during
and after puberty that are at odds with the outward appearance or assigned
gender. Additionally, they may also remove them to reduce an elevated cancer
risk (sometimes reasonably and sometimes not).
While sterilization (in the sense of the purposeful ending of fertility) is not,
as a general rule, the stated intention of these surgeries, the removal of
reproductive organs nonetheless raises some pertinent ethical, medical, and legal
issues. Fertility is inherently speculative even when a person possesses all the
"correct" reproductive organs. Sterilization involves the removal of reproductive
organs. Whether or not these surgeons intend to do so, they are, in effect,
sterilizing the child when they elect to remove his or her reproductive organs.
This election should be considered independently of the child's actual or
predicted fertility.
The Supreme Court of the United States has recognized procreation as a
fundamental constitutional right. ' As a result, parental consent on the child's
behalf may not be legally sufficient for surgeries that require removal of
reproductive organs, even for purposes of treating DSDs. Moreover, such
surgeries may violate state constitutional rights, such as the California
16. See Peter E. Lee et al., American Academy of Pediatrics, Consensus Statement on the Management
of Intersex Disorders, 118 PEDIATRICS e488 (2006) [hereinafter Consensus Statement] (establishing a
standardized approach to the nomenclature and treatment of DSDs). This is not a "side effect" because that
would suggest an unintended result.
17. See Intersex Society of North America, Frequently Asked Questions: Osteoporosis,
http://www.isna.org/node/724 (last visited Mar. 29, 2011) [hereinafter FAQ: Osteoporosis] (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review) (noting that many intersex individuals are at increased risk of osteoporosis and
advising them: "If you were born without functioning gonads (ovaries or testes), or if your gonads have been
removed, you should be under an endocrinologist's care and maintain hormone replacement therapy for life.").
18. Anne Tamar-Mattis, Exceptions to the Rule: Curing the Law's Failure to Protect Intersex Infants, 21
BERKELEY J. OF GENDER L. & JUST. 59, 67 (2006) [hereinafter Exceptions to the Rule] ("[Slurgeons routinely
remove gonads, regardless of potential function, if they will detract from normative genital appearance or if
they will produce hormones that will cause development of the 'wrong' secondary sexual characteristics."); see
DREGER, supra note 10, at 28 ("[Plhysicians appear to do far more to preserve the reproductive potential of
children born with ovaries than that of children born with testes. While genetically male intersexuals often have
infertile testes [which may change depending on future medical advancements], some men with micropenis may
be able to father children if allowed to retain their testes.").
19. See Skinner v. Okl. ex rel Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) ("There is no redemption for the
individual whom the [sterilization] law touches. Any experiment which the State conducts is to his irreparable
injury. He is forever deprived of a basic liberty."); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977)
("The decision whether or not to beget or bear a child is at the very heart of this cluster of constitutionally
protected choices. That decision holds a particularly important place in the history of the right of privacy ....
This is understandable, for in a field that by definition concerns the most intimate of human activities and
relationships, decisions whether to accomplish or to prevent conception are among the most private and
sensitive.").
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Constitution's right to privacy.20 However, courts may distinguish these
procedures by separating them into at least four categories: (1) immediately life-
preserving treatments (as in cancerous and precancerous cells); (2) potentially
life-preserving treatments (as in conditions with a higher likelihood of gonadal
cancer in adulthood); (3) function-preserving treatments; and (4) appearance-
related treatments. Arguably, only the first category justifies immediate treatment
authorized by surrogate consent.
In other kinds of medical treatment for minors and the mentally disabled,
courts have decided that parental consent may be inadequate to authorize certain
procedures.2 1 In those specialized situations, hospitals, doctors, and parents have
utilized judicial hearings to ensure that the child's due process rights are
protected and that a neutral third party is involved in the decision-making
process.22 These same protections can be applied to a new category of cases
without the need for creating a new paradigm of protections. At a minimum,
children with DSDs are being deprived of their right to bodily integrity; thus,
they require procedural due process protections to preserve their right to
privacy.23 These children are also likely deprived of the right to procreate, which
is also part of the right to privacy. Normally, a parent's medical decision is
presumed to uphold the child's constitutional rights. An essential part of this
judicial hearing process is the appointment to the minor of a guardian ad litem or
attorney who assumes a legal and ethical obligation to presume that the child
would oppose the actions of the parents. In the DSD context, children need an
independent voice to represent their future procreative interests, and the judicial
hearing process can provide those substantive and procedural due process
protections. Parents are making medical decisions for medical choices that will
take place decades in the future and those future medical treatments could be
significantly different and/or advanced from what is available today.
This Comment argues that, because of the uncertainty inherent in defining
such concepts as "fertility," for twenty, thirty, or forty years in the future, judicial
hearing procedures should apply to the removal of any reproductive organ, either
20. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1. Civil rights guaranteed under the California Constitution are not dependent
on the interpretation of the same rights under the federal Constitution. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 24. The California
Constitution grants an explicit right to privacy that is greater in scope than the right to privacy under the federal
Constitution, with no distinction between the privacy rights of adults and minors. Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v.
Lungren, 16 Cal. 4th 307, 326 (1997) ("[N]ot only is the state constitutional right of privacy embodied in
explicit constitutional language not present in the federal Constitution, but past California cases establish that,
in many contexts, the scope and application of the state constitutional right of privacy is broader and more
protective of privacy than the federal constitutional right of privacy as interpreted by the federal courts.").
21. See infra section M.A.
22. See, e.g., Tamar-Mattis, Exceptions to the Rule, supra note 18, at 93-98 (describing how courts and
legislatures have made categorical exceptions to the normal legal presumption in favor of supporting parental
surrogate consent).
23. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
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internal or external. Many states already mandate judicial hearings before
approving the intentional sterilization of an individual with mental disabilities
who is incapable of consenting to medical treatment.24 States could easily extend
these protections to children with DSDs who are in danger of having
reproductive organs removed. This Comment argues that the current California
statutory protections for the mentally-disabled provide a workable and natural
alternative to the current parental informed consent model while adequately
protecting children's constitutional rights.
This Comment's analysis is divided into six parts. Part II provides a brief
overview of the DSD standard of care and the medical standard this Comment
proposes. Part III examines the constitutional legal background, and includes an
overview of the parental/surrogate informed consent process that hospitals and
doctors currently use to secure informed consent for surgeries removing a child's
reproductive organs. This section also discusses the fundamental rights of parents
and children, and the interplay between those rights. Part IV presents the federal
Constitutional backdrop of the fundamental constitutional rights of children. Part
V examines the California approach to surgeries that sterilize the mentally
incompetent. Part VI presents an overview of similar DSD cases in other
countries. Part VII argues that surgical treatments that remove reproductive
organs implicate the fundamental right to procreate for children with DSDs, and
that the current parental informed consent standard is insufficient for giving up a
child's fundamental rights to bodily integrity, privacy, and procreation. This
Comment ultimately concludes that a judicial hearing process with adequate
procedural protections is better able to protect a child's interests than the total
lack of protections today.
II. THE MEDICAL STANDARD OF CARE
Ideally, a medical standard of care is the product of time, study, and
experimentation.25 Unfortunately, the scientific method of testing and retesting to
24. See, e.g., In re Grady, 426 A.2d 467 (N.J. 1981) (finding that New Jersey law requires a judicial
hearing to allow parents to consent to the sterilization of their mentally disabled daughter and requiring clear
and convincing proof that the sterilization is in the best interest of the patient); A.L. v. G.R.H., 325 N.E.2d 501
(Ind. 1975) (finding that the common law does not authorize a parent to sterilize her brain-damanged child); In
re M.K.R., 515 S.W.2d 467 (Mo. 1974) (finding that even the courts did not have jurisdiction to approve a
parent's request to sterilize a child with mental disabilities without express statutory approval); Ruby v. Massey,
452 F. Supp. 361, 366 (D. Conn. 1978) (finding that parents "may neither veto nor give valid consent to the
sterilization of their children"); In re Guardianship of Hayes, 608 P.2d 635 (Wash. 1980) (finding that a parent
cannot consent to the sterilization of a child with mental disabilities and that there is a "heavy presumption"
against sterilization); and In re Moe, 432 N.E.2d 712 (Mass. 1982) (finding that individuals with mental
disabilities enjoy the same constitutional right to privacy and procreation as any other individual; however, this
finding allowed the court jurisdiction to entertain parental requests for the sterilization of their children).
25. See Hazel Glenn Beh & Milton Diamond, An Emerging Ethical and Medical Dilemma: Should
Physicians Perform Sex Assignment on Infants with Ambiguous Genitalia?, 7 MICH. J. OF GENDER & L. 1, 12-
15 (2000) (describing the irregular occurrence when "standard medical practice sometimes develops from case
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determine an appropriate standard is not always readily available or practicable
in certain situations.26 The treatment of DSDs developed largely from a single
case study, Dr. John Money's "John/Joan" study.27 The standard he developed
recommended genital surgery and hormone treatment to "normalize" infants with
DSDs, urged secrecy by both doctors and parents, and admonished parents to
raise the child strictly in the assigned gender." To date, this standard still has not
been proven medically or psychologically beneficial, and no patient has ever
stepped forward to defend the practice despite heavy public and academic
criticism.
In 1967, Money was a medical visionary.29 Following his own psychological
theories, he believed that nurture, not nature, determined gender.30 A botched
circumcision gave him the opportunity to test his theory.3' Because the damage to
the infant's penis was severe and reconstructive surgery would have been unable
to restore it, Money convinced the parents to consent to the surgical creation of a
vagina and the removal of the child's testes.32 Because the child had an identical
male twin, the experiment "came bundled with a built-in control," making it an
33ideal test case. Under Money's guidance, the parents strictly raised their son
"John" as their daughter "Joan" after the surgery, thus emphasizing nurture over
nature.34 Despite the parents' best efforts, "Joan" rebelled against her gender
assignment even as a toddler and at the age of fourteen chose to live as a male.
However, Money falsified his research about "Joan," claiming that she was a
reports, word-of-mouth and the gradual clinical acceptance of innovative therapy without true scientific scrutiny
of its effectiveness").
26. See id.
27. Id. (describing how "the surgical standard for treatment of these cases moved from innovation to
standard practice" largely as a result of a single case report); DREGER, supra note 10, at 27.
28. DREGER, supra note 10, at 27-29; see JOHN MONEY & ANKE EHRHARDT, MAN & WOMAN, BOY &
GIRL: THE DIFFFERENTIATION AND DIMORPHISM OF GENDER IDENTITY FROM CONCEPTION TO MATURITY 119-
23 (1972).
29. See generally MONEY & EHRHARDT, supra note 28 (presenting Money's sex and gender theories to
the public in the form of a college-level textbook).
30. DREGER, supra note 10, at 25 (summarizing Money's approach as "(1) individuals are
psychosexually neutral at birth and (2) healthy psychosexual development is dependent on the appearance of the
genitals"); see MONEY & EHRHARDT, supra note 28, at 145 ("Children growing up in a culture differentiate a
gender identity free from ambiguity if the adults of that culture, especially those closest to them, transmit clear
and unambiguous signals .... ).
31. MONEY & EHRHARDT, supra note 28, at 119-23; Jesse Walker, The Death of David Reimer: A Tale
of Sex, Science, and Abuse, REASON.COM, May 24, 2004, http://reason.com/archives/2004/05/24/the-death-of-
david-reimer (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
32. DREGER, supra note 10, at 25; Walker, supra note 28.
33. Walker, supra note 31.
34. MONEY & EHRHARDT, supra note 28, at 119-23.
35. John Colapinto, Gender Gap: What Were the Real Reasons Behind David Reimer's Suicide?, SLATE,
June 3, 2004, http://www.slate.com/id/2101678/ [hereinafter Colapinto, Gender Gap] (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review); John Colapinto, The True Story of John/Joan, ROLLING STONE, Dec. 11, 1997, at 54
[hereinafter Colapinto, True Story ofJohn/Joan]; Walker, supra note 31.
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well-adjusted and stereotypical little girl. Publishing his experiment as a
success, he maintained that "Joan" had been lost to follow-up. 7 This falsification
of one incomplete case study led to the creation of a medical standard of care.
In 1997, "John," now known as David Reimer, went public about the failure
of his treatment in order to discredit Money and his work. 9 Reimer underwent
surgical procedures to reverse his childhood surgeries, including a double
mastectomy and two phalloplasty operations." He attempted to live a normal life
by getting married and adopting his wife's children. 4' Nevertheless, Reimer
suffered significant depression throughout his life, which he linked to his
childhood treatments. In 2004, he committed suicide at the age of thirty-eight.42
Today, Money's standard of care is changing, though slowly. While the
traditional DSD parental informed consent model was based upon "urgency,
partial and inaccurate disclosure of the conditions and risk, [and] a sense of
secrecy and shame," the medical community is backing away from that model.43
However, many believe that change is not occurring fast enough.4 Regardless of
whether changes are made to the current model, the problem remains that a
parent may not legally be able to consent to a DSD treatment that removes his or
36. Beh & Diamond, supra note 25, at 5-12 (noting that Dr. Money was aware of Joan's resistance to
her gender assignment as a female but did not add this information, that "might have had an impact on the
developing standard of care," to his case study). Doctors applied Money's theories not only to children with
DSDs or genital accidents like Reimer's, but also to boys with "abnormally small genitals" and those who
suffered traumatic penile injuries. Walker, supra note 31.
36. Colapinto, Gender Gap, supra note 35.
37. Beh & Diamond, supra note 25, at 5-12; Walker, supra note 31.
37. Colapinto, Gender Gap, supra note 35.
38. Beh & Diamond, supra note 25, at 5-12; Walker, supra note 31.
39. Colapinto, Gender Gap, supra note 35 ("David learned that the supposed success of his sex
reassignment had been used to legitimize the widespread use of infant sex change in cases of hermaphroditism
and genital injury. Outraged, David agreed to participate in a follow-up by Dr. Diamond, whose myth-shattering
paper (co-authored by Dr. Keith Sigmundson) was published in Archives of Pediatrics and Adolescent Medicine
in March 1997 and was featured on front pages across the globe.").
40. DREGER, supra note 10, at 25.
41. Id.
42. Colapinto, True Story of John/Joan, supra note 35; Colapinto, Gender Gap, supra note 35 ("David's
blighted childhood was never far from his mind. Just before he died, he talked to his wife about his sexual
'inadequacy,' his inability to be a true husband."); Walker, supra note 31.
43. See Consensus Statement, supra note 16 (establishing a standardized approach to the nomenclature
and treatment of DSDs). For a more detailed discussion of the traditional DSD standard of care, see Beh &
Diamond, supra note 25, at 5-12, 34.
44. In describing the changes suggested by the Consensus Statement, the Intersex Society of North
America [disbanded in 2008 and replaced by Accord Alliance], lamented that "as wonderful and historic as
these changes are, no institution has fully implemented them. There are no mechanisms are [sic] in place to
foster implementation nor to evaluate to what extent these changes improve health care experiences and
outcomes for persons and families affected by DSDs." Intersex Society of North America, Home Page,
http://www.isna.org/ (last visited Mar. 29, 2010) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
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her child's reproductive organs without violating the child's civil rights under
42 USC § 1984.45
While Reimer did not have a DSD, his gender reassignment surgery removed
his functional testes.4 This Comment argues that if doctors and parents decide
that surgical removal of a child's reproductive organs (either internal or external)
is necessary or beneficial,47 the law should require a judicial hearing process to
provide adequate procedural and substantive due process protections for the
child. This argument is stronger for the removal of internal reproductive organs
than for the alteration or removal of external reproductive organs because one
can tie those reproductive organs closer to the likelihood of fertility due to being
the source of eggs and sperm. While there is a key distinction to be made
between fertility and sterilization, to date, that distinction has not been part of the
discourse on DSD treatment.
III. CURRENT LEGAL AUTHORITY FOR THE MEDICAL CARE OF CHILDREN
A. Parental Authority and Substituted Consent
The current legal standard for DSD treatments is parental informed consent.48
Nearly every medical treatment of a minor relies on the parental informed
consent model.49 Parental informed consent is entirely removed from the judicial
process and requires no approval by a neutral third party.o While medical
ethicists argue that young children should assent to medical care and teenagers
should consent,"' the law requires neither." The Supreme Court of the United
States recognizes a legal presumption that a parent acts in the best interest of his
45. Doctors who perform these procedures may also be liable for violations of the child's civil right to
procreate in the future under the same statute. 42 USC § 1984.
46. This surgery left Reimer infertile. See, e.g., Colapinto, Gender Gap, supra note 35 (noting that
Money told Reimer's parents that their child would grow up to be a "sterile woman," but capable of
heterosexual intercourse).
47. The author does not argue that all children with DSDs are entitled to this judicial hearing process,
only those children whose reproductive organs may be removed should be constitutionally entitled to these
procedural protections.
48. Beh & Diamond, supra note 25, at 37-38; Alicia Ouellette, Shaping Parental Authority Over
Children's Bodies, 85 IND. L.J. 955, 966-69 (2010) [hereinafter Ouellette, Shaping] (arguing that a parent
should not have the unlimited ability to "size, shape, sculpt, or mine their children's body for social, aesthetic,
familial, or cultural reasons"); Exceptions to the Rule, supra note 18, at 78.
49. Beh & Diamond, supra note 25, at 37-38; Ouellette, Shaping, supra note 48, at 966-69; Tamar-
Mattis, Exceptions to the Rule, supra note 18, at 78.
50. Beh & Diamond, supra note 25, at 37-38; Ouellette, Shaping, supra note 48, at 966-69; Tamar-
Mattis, Exceptions to the Rule, supra note 18, at 78.
51. Sometimes a teenager's consent is sufficient for medical care, though a parent may override that
consent in most cases, which will be discussed later in this section. See infra Part IUl.B.
52. Ouellette, Shaping, supra note 48, at 968 ("In most cases, the child's wishes are essentially
irrelevant.").
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or her child when choosing the appropriate course of medical treatment,53 subject
only to a few exceptions.54
Generally, parents have a constitutional right to control the conduct and
upbringing of their children." This right includes a legal presumption that the
parent is the child's medical decision-maker until the child reaches legal age and
is able to consent. So long as the parents and doctors agree on a treatment plan
involving an accepted standard of care, courts have traditionally deferred to
parental choice and declined to intervene. The courts will always intervene,
however, when the child's life or well-being is in danger and the parents are not
providing "standard medical care."" Nonetheless, the courts will generally defer
to the parents' choice of treatment so long as the proposed treatment is
considered acceptable medical care--even if endorsed by only a small minority
of medical practitioners ."
53. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 601-02 (1979). Implicitly, Parham appears to limit parental decision-
making "to decisions that are medically necessary or otherwise therapeutic." Ouellette, Shaping, supra note 48,
at 985.
54. Some of the exceptions (which are generally irrelevant to children treated for DSDs with the
removal of reproductive organs) include: limiting a parent's ability to enroll his or her child in an experimental
treatment, a parent's ability to institutionalize his or her child without neutral approval, a parent's ability to limit
his or her child's education, and a parent's refusal of life-saving medical treatment for the child. See 45 C.F.R.
§§ 46.401-409 (2009) (limiting non-therapeutic experimental research protocols that parents may choose for
their children); Parham, 442 U.S. at 606 (finding that a mother did not have the unilateral right to
institutionalize her six-year-old son without an inquiry by a "neutral factfinder"); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205, 213 (1972) (noting that there is "no doubt as to the power of a State" to regulate a "basic education,"
including a required minimum duration of education (citing Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534
(1925)); Douglas S. Diekema, Parental Refusals of Medical Treatment: the Harm Principle as a Threshold for
State Intervention, 25 THEORETICAL MED. & BIOETHICs 243 (2004) (arguing that the "best interests" standard is
insufficient to protect a minor's interests in medical decisions and is not the standard used by the courts and
medical practitioners).
55. See, e.g., Prince v. Mass., 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) ("It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and
nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for
obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder."); Parham, 442 U.S. at 602 (noting that "parents generally
have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare their children for additional obligations....
Surely, this includes a 'high duty' to recognize symptoms of illness and to seek and follow medical advice."
(internal citations and quotations removed)); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (finding that parents have
the right to instruct and educate their children as they see fit); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35
(1925) (finding that parents have the right to choose to send their children to private schools that reinforce the
moral and religious education chosen by the parents).
56. See, e.g., Parham, 442 U.S. at 602 ("The law's concept of the family rests on a presumption that
parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment required for making life's
difficult decisions. More important, historically it has recognized that natural bonds of affection lead parents to
act in the best interests of their children.").
57. Tamar-Mattis, Exceptions to the Rule, supra note 18, at 79.
58. See, e.g., Guardianship of Phillip B., 188 Cal. Rptr. 781, 791-92 (1st Dist. 1983) (holding that
parents' continuing care would result in harm to the minor). See Prince, 321 U.S. at 166 ("The right to practice
religion freely does not include liberty to expose . . . the child . . . to ill health or death.").
59. Tamar-Mattis, Exceptions to the Rule, supra note 18, at 80; Ouellette, Shaping, supra note 48, at
969.
Parental choice is the rule in shaping cases. The exceptions do not apply. The use of shaping
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The two most common exceptions to the parental presumption are organ
donation proceduress and procedures with the primary purpose of sterilization
(generally of the mentally disabled or mentally ill).6 ' There are three primary
concerns that cause the courts to override parental consent: (1) the parents'
potential conflict of interest; (2) the impairment of the child's fundamental rights;
and (3) the lack of medical benefit to the child.62 Arguably, all three concerns
exist in the cases addressed by this Comment. Part VI addresses the first two
concerns. The third concern is better left to other authors and activists, though
there is a short discussion in Part V(A) that may independently justify the
removal of treatment decisions from parents.63 One should note that the calls for a
moratorium on childhood DSD treatment tend to focus on external genital
interventions does not deprive a child of lifesaving treatments or involve drug treatment, abortion, or
institutionalization.Although shaping interventions implicate a child's rights to bodily integrity, they
do so no more than other cases involving the use of medical and surgical interventions. And where a
parent chooses to use medicine or surgery for a child (as opposed to when a parent refuses medicine
or surgery) courts are generally unwilling to consider the child's best interests when the desired
intervention has the support of even one licensed medical provider.
Id.
60. In the organ donation context, courts are hesitant when one minor child is being asked to donate to a
sibling, fearing that the parents are unable to consider the best interests of both children. See, e.g., Little v.
Little, 576 S.W.2d 493 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (involving a mother seeking to get a kidney donation from her
fourteen-year-old daughter with Down's Syndrome for her little brother); Michele Goodwin, My Sister's
Keeper: Law, Children, and Compelled Donation, 29 W. NEw ENG. L. REV. 357, 358 (2007) ("The Essay
scrutinizes whether and under what circumstances parents' rationalization for compelling organ and tissue
donation from their children is ever proper or legitimate. In other words, when and under what circumstances
can parents impose that duty-to rescue-on their children to save the life of another.").
61. Tamar-Mattis, Exceptions to the Rule, supra note 18, at 93-97.
62. Id. For another version of the factors a court will consider to override parental consent to a child's
medical care, see Beh & Diamond, supra note 25, at 41 ("1) [T]he decisional capacity of the minor; 2) the
burden and risk of treatment; and 3) the effectiveness of the treatment.").
63. See, e.g., Tamar-Mattis, Exceptions to the Rule, supra note 18 (arguing for a moratorium on
childhood genital surgery as a treatment for DSDs); Intersex Society of North America, What Does ISNA
Recommend for Children with Intersex?, http://www.isna.org/faq/patient-centered (last visited Mar. 29, 2010)
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review) ("Surgeries done to make the genitals look 'more normal' should not
be performed until a child is mature enough to make an informed decision for herself or himself."); Milton
Diamond & H. Keith Sigmundson, Management of Intersexuality: Guidelines for Dealing with Persons with
Ambiguous Genitalia, 151 ARCHIVES PEDIATRIC ADOLESCENT MED. 1046 (1997) (calling for a moratorium on
childhood genital surgery); Nancy Ehrenreich & Mark Barr, Intersex Surgery, Female Genital Cutting, and the
Selective Condemnation of "Cultural Practices," 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 71, 131-32 (2005) (arguing that
DSD external genital surgery should be treated consistently with the modem American outrage against female
genital mutilation, which is discussed briefly in Part III). But see Laura D. Hermer, A Moratorium on Intersex
Surgeries?: Law, Science, Identity, and Bioethics at the Crossroads, 13 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 255, 255-56
(2007) (arguing that a moratorium is unnecessary because of three primary reasons: (1) that it "would also
hobble, if not eliminate, the burgeoning scientific investigation of the best treatment practices for different
intersex conditions which seeks to gather information from broad and objectively chosen groups of
individuals;" (2) that it "would remove a surgical option that, according to data in a number of studies, has
benefited and satisfied numerous patients;" and (3) that these "solutions to the problem of early surgeries do
nothing to constructively address the deep-seated and often murky social, interpersonal and psychological
reasons such surgeries take place").
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surgery rather than on the internal ramifications.6 Many of the cases examined
by this Comment do not require external genital surgery. For example, female-
gendered children with androgen insensitivity syndrome (AIS)6 require no
external genital surgery, although doctors would likely seek to remove internal
undescended or partially-descended testes. If doctors or courts adopt a
moratorium on infant external genital surgery without developing an overarching
legal framework, children such as these may continue to have hormonally-
motivated surgeries to remove their internal reproductive organs before reaching
the age of consent.
B. The Rights of Children
The Supreme Court has recognized that children have full constitutional
rights that co-exist with parental rights.6 However, parents sometimes exercise
these constitutionally-protected rights on their child's behalf, particularly those
67
rights that relate to their ability to consent to or decline medical treatment. No
person may be deprived of "life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law."8 Due to cases like Griswold v. Connecticut09 and Roe v. Wade,0 the rights
to privacy and procreation are considered liberties under the Fourteenth
7'Amendment, and children are considered "persons" for due process purposes.
Because the law considers children to be legally incompetent persons, their rights
are exercised through legal surrogates who consent on the child's behalf." These
rights include the right to autonomy,73 the right to privacy,74 the right to bodily
64. See supra note 63 and accompanying text (noting articles calling for a moratorium on "genital
normalization" surgeries).
65. AIS occurs when a child is genetically male, but a genetic defect makes the child resistant to the
male appearance-causing hormones called androgens. Therefore, the child develops externally as a female. AIS
Support Group, What is AIS?, www.aissg.org/21_overview.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2011) (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
66. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969) (holding that children
are "persons" under section one of the 14th Amendment); see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("[N]or shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
67. Beh & Diamond, supra note 25, at 37-38; Ouellette, Shaping, supra note 48, at 966-69; Tamar-
Mattis, Exceptions to the Rule, supra note 18, at 78.
68. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1.
69. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
70. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
71. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511.
72. Tamar-Mattis, Exceptions to the Rule, supra note 18, at 79.
73. See United States v. King, 840 F.2d 1276, 1283 (2d Cir. 1988) (citing Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187,
193 (1962)) ("Our law views the child as an individual with the dignity and humanity of other individuals, not
as property.").
74. See Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (finding that parents do not
hold a veto power over their child's right to seek an abortion); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (finding
that minors have a right to privacy in the abortion context).
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integrity75 (which many states have interpreted to limit the parental "right" to
consent to the purposeful sterilization of his or her child 7 ), and the right to some
limitation on parental involvement when a minor wishes to obtain an abortion."
The Court has also found that children have "a significant liberty interest in not
being confined unnecessarily for medical treatment."7  Further, it appears that
children have "exclusive rights to make certain fundamental decisions for
themselves, and parents cannot make choices that will deprive the child of the
opportunity to make those choices as an adult,""9 which should include the right
to decide if and when to remove or alter one's reproductive organs.
One federal statute embodies many of the important policy issues that
legislatures will likely consider in the DSD context. In 1996, Congress passed the
Criminalization of Female Genital Mutilation Act,8o which criminalizes the
circumcision, excision, and infibulation" of "the whole or any part of the labia
majora or labia minora or clitoris of another person who has not attained the age
of 18 years," unless the procedure is medically necessary for the health of the
patient.82 While intended to address cultural and religious female genital
mutilation," this statute potentially criminalizes DSD treatment surgeries that
reduce the size of an enlarged clitoris, yet no such prosecutions are known to
75. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 320 (1982) (finding, among other constitutional rights, a
freedom from bodily restraints); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa.v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849 (1992)
("[T]he Constitution places limits on a State's right to interfere with a person's most basic decisions about
family and parenthood ... as well as bodily integrity.. . ." (internal citations omitted)).
76. See, e.g., Ruby v. Massey, 452 F. Supp. 631 (D. Conn. 1978) (finding that parents had neither the
authority to consent to their child's sterilization nor the veto power to prevent it); A.L. v. G.R.H., 325 N.E.2d
501 (Ind. 1975) (finding that the common law does not authorize a parent to sterilize her child with brain
damage); In re Guardianship of Hayes, 608 P.2d 635 (Wash. 1980) (finding that a parent cannot consent to the
sterilization of a child with mental disabilities and that there is a "heavy presumption" against sterilization).
77. See Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (finding that a state cannot require parental consent for a minor's abortion
during the first twelve weeks of pregnancy); Bellotti, 443 U.S. 622 (finding that a third-party cannot have an
absolute veto right over a minor's abortion); Casey, 505 U.S. at 899 ("[A] State may require a minor seeking an
abortion to obtain the consent of a parent or guardian, provided that there is adequate judicial bypass
procedure.").
78. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 600 (1979). The Court has found unconstitutional statutes prohibiting
the distribution of contraceptive devices to minors, as well as statutes allowing parents to veto a minor's
abortion. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 681; Danforth, 428 U.S. 52.
79. Ouellette, Shaping, supra note 48, at 981.
80. 18 U.S.C. § 116 (2009).
81. Infibulation is the "[c]losure of the vaginal vestibule by creating a fusion of the labia majora;
typically done after excision of the labia minora and clitoris and incision of the labia majora to create raw
surfaces that can be surgically joined by pinning so that they will eventually grow together; done for cultural,
not medical, reasons." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY (27th ed. 2000).
82. 18 U.S.C. § 116.
83. Female Genital Mutilation Act, Pub. Law No. 104-208, § 645(a)(l)-(3), 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1997)
("Congress finds that (1) the practice of female genital mutilation is carried out by members of certain cultural
and religious groups within the United States; (2) the practice of female genital mutilation often results in the
occurrence of physical and psychological health effects that harm the women involved; [and] (3) such
mutilation infringes upon the guarantees of rights secured by Federal and State law, both statutory and
constitutional[.]").
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have occurred." Though this statute does not affect reproductive organs per se, it
shows Congress' concern for the bodily integrity of female children.
C. The Rights of the Patient Unable to Provide Consent
For over forty years, courts and legislators have considered the quandary of
how to protect the procreative rights of those individuals with mental disabilities
who are unable to manifest informed consent for birth control and sterilization
procedures. The right to procreate is the personal right to make an informed
choice whether to have children."
In the usual DSD case, the only incapacity suffered by the patient is infancy,
which is an incapacity that cures itself with time-time these children generally
have.6 The only DSD that potentially presents a medical emergency at birth or
soon thereafter is virilizing congenital adrenal hyperplasia (virilizing CAH)."7
84. See Exceptions to the Rule, supra note 18, at 107 n.356.
There are several political and practical problems with this strategy. These include the fact that the
statute's language seems to exclude some, and arguably all, genital-normalizing surgeries on intersex
infants. ... Another problem is that it is a criminal statute-it seems unlikely that the public would
approve criminal sanctions on the doctors who perform [DSD] surgeries.... (Notwithstanding the
American public's willingness to apply criminal sanctions to practitioners who cut non-intersex
female babies' genitals in order to align their bodies with their families' cultural norms). A civil
strategy seems more promising.
Id. (internal citations omitted); see also Beh & Diamond, supra note 25, at 21-22 ("Interestingly, the effect of
the [Act] on medical treatment on infant females with enlarged [clitorises] is unknown. ... It remains to be seen
whether a court might view surgical treatment to achieve normally-appearing female genitalia as necessary to
the health of infants."); Kate Haas, Who Will Make Room for the Intersexed?, 30 AM. J.L. & MED. 41, 55 (2004)
("[W]hile no intersexed Americans have successfully sued a physician or hospital for conducting early genital
reconstructive surgery, they may have grounds to sue based on female genital mutilation laws, the constitutional
right to privacy and lack of informed consent by their parents."); Ehrenreich & Barr, supra note 63, at 131-32
(noting that, among other benefits of criminalizing DSD genital surgeries, "that such a policy would reflect the
legitimate sense of harm and violation that many intersex individuals feel as a result of their surgeries, and
would represent a societal recognition that the practice is hurtful and lacks justification. The physical and
psychological harms of intersex surgeries catalogued above not only establish the practice's similarity to
[female genital mutilation] but also stand as independent justifications for criminalization").
85. See, e.g., Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 772 (1985),
overruled in nonrelevant part by Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 ("Few
decisions are more personal and intimate, more properly private, or more basic to individual dignity and
autonomy, than a woman's decision-with the guidance of her physician and within the limits specified in
Roe-whether to end her pregnancy.").
86. See Tamar-Mattis, Exceptions to the Rule, supra note 18, at 65 ("Although the vast majority of these
babies have no medical condition that will result in physical harm, doctors act quickly to assign a gender, and
often pressure parents to consent to immediate surgery to conform the genitals [and gonads] to this assigned
gender.").
87. For instance, children with CAH have difficulties producing cortisone, which is easily treatable but
may result in death if left untreated. Intersex Society of North America, Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH)
Medical Risks, http://www.isna.org/faq/medical-risks/cah (last visited Mar. 29, 2010) [hereinafter CAH Risks]
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review). CAH occurs when "the adrenal glands, while trying to make
cortisone, ... make an unusually high level of other hormones that are 'virilizing' That is, they can make XX
embryos have larger than average clitorises, or even a clitoris that looks rather like a penis, or labia that look
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While gonadal cancer can also arise with various DSDs, it typically presents only
a "slight" risk before early adulthood, depending on the condition." On the other
hand, "[flunctioning gonads, even partially functioning gonads, are a big
advantage over hormone replacement therapy.""9 However, even partially
functioning testes should generally be removed before puberty for an intersex
child with a female gender in order to prevent male secondary sex
characteristics.' This surgery can be delayed until the child is able to
meaningfully participate in the decision-making process-there is no need for the
surgery to take place when the child is an infant or toddler.
It is important to note that if the gonads have already developed cancerous
cells, no court approval is necessary for parents to consent to their removal
because, in this case, the surgery is a medical necessity.9 ' Therefore, if no
precancerous or cancerous cells have yet developed, parents should seek judicial
approval for the removal of the testes. Along the same lines, if there is no
medical emergency and the child is still incapable of providing meaningful
consent at the age when puberty is expected, puberty can be temporarily delayed
with medication in order to allow the child to participate more meaningfully in
the medical decision-making process at a later date.92
The Supreme Court has not directly confronted the sterilization of
individuals with mental disabilities. It did, however, deny a patient's demand to
lift judicial immunity for the judge who "fail[ed] to comply with elementary
principles of procedural due process" by authorizing a mother's petition for her
daughter's sterilization, and grant full immunity to all parties involved.93 Without
like a scrotum." Intersex Society of North America, Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH),
http://www.isna.org/faq/conditions/cah (last visited Mar. 29, 2010) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
88. Intersex Society of North America, FAQ: Gonadal Tumors, http://www.isna.org/node/737 (last
visited Mar. 29, 2010) [hereinafter Gonadal Tumors] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); Tamar-Mattis,
Exceptions to the Rule, supra note 18, at 67 n.58. On the other hand, removal of the gonad tissue (a
gonadectomy) greatly increases the risk of osteoporosis. A patient with a gonadectomy will require hormone
replacement therapy for life. The former Intersex Society of North America recognized the even greater risk of
osteoporosis for patients with DSDs, who usually develop a distrust of doctors and therefore, will not seek the
hormone treatment they need. FAQ: Osteoporosis, supra note 17. ("Many people with intersex conditions,
having developed a distrust or aversion for medical people, avoid medical care and drop hormone replacement
therapy which was prescribed during puberty.").
89. Gonadal Tumors, supra note 89.
90. CAH Risks, supra note 88 ("If it is difficult to determine the child's gender identity or wishes,
puberty can be temporarily delayed with the drug Lupron. This is not a permanent solution, but a delaying
tactic.").
91. Tamar-Mattis, Exploring Gray Areas, supra note 1 ("When gonadectomy or hysterectomy is
elective-that is, not necessary to preserve life or limb-we enter a legal gray area . . . .").
92. CAH Risks, supra note 88. One such drug is Lupron, but research on the long-term effects of this or
other puberty-suppressing drugs is incomplete. See Lupron.com, Important Safety Information,
http://www.lupron.com/important-safety-information.cfm (follow the hyperlink "CHILDREN Central
Precocious Puberty") (last visited Mar. 29, 2010) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) ("Studies have not
been completed in children to determine the full reversibility of fertility suppression.").
93. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355 (1978) (quoting the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit's decision to lift judicial immunity).
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reaching the merits of the patient's constitutional claims," the Court (while
noting the lack of any procedural protections such as notice, a hearing, or the
appointment of a guardian ad litem) held that all judicial acts are nonetheless
granted judicial immunity." Three dissenting justices agreed that the circuit
judge's approval "was beyond the pale of anything that could sensibly be called a
judicial act" and appeared to find the trial judge's analysis of the underlying
sterilization claim shocking and unconstitutional. Although it is simply dicta,
the Court's commentary is likely predictive of how American courts would
analyze this issue and the procedural requirements that they would likely require.
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL BACKDROP
The concept of eugenicsm was welcomed in a "progressive," industrialized
America.8 In Buck v. Bell, the Supreme Court upheld the desirability of eugenics
as a state interest and noted that this interest outweighed the mentally disabled
community's interest in bodily integrity." Notably, when Buck was decided, the
Court had not yet recognized a fundamental right to procreate.'" However, after
the horrors wrought by Hitler's admiration of American eugenic practices,'1 the
94. The plaintiff claimed the following nine constitutional violations:
1. [Tlhat the actions [of the judge] were arbitrary and thus in violation of the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment; 2. that [plaintiff] was denied procedural safeguards required by the
Fourteenth Amendment; 3. that the sterilization was permitted without the promulgation of
standards; 4. that the sterilization was an invasion of privacy; 5. that the sterilization violated
[plaintiff]'s right to procreate; 6. that the sterilization was cruel and unusual punishment; 7. that the
use of sterilization as punishment for her alleged retardation or lack of self-discipline violated
various constitutional guarantees; 8. that the defendants failed to follow certain Indiana statutes, thus
depriving [plaintiff] of due process of law; and 9. that defendants violated the equal protection
clause, because of the differential treatment accorded [plaintiff] on account of her sex, marital status,
and allegedly low mental capacity.
Id. at 354 n.2.
95. Id. at 360.
96. Id. at 365 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
97. Eugenics is "the 'science' of improving the human race through controlled breeding." Center for
Individual Freedom, The Sterilization of America: A Cautionary History, http://www.cfif.org/htdocs/
freedomline/current/in-ouropinion/un-sterile_past.html (last visited Aug. 16, 2010) [hereinafter Sterilization
of America] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
98. See id.
99. 274 U.S. 200 (1927). The court approved the sterilization of a woman born of a mother with mental
disabilities who had given birth to a daughter with mental disabilities. As memorably stated by Justice Holmes,
"Three generations of imbeciles are enough." Id. at 207. But see Nancy Gibbs, Pillow Angel Ethics, TIME, Jan.
22, 2007, available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171, 1576833,00.html (quoting disability
rights expert Arlene Mayerson: "Benevolence and good intentions have been among the biggest enemies of
disabled people over the course of history. . . . Many things that were done under a theory of benevolence were
later seen as wrongheaded violations of human rights."). Buck v. Bell has not been explicitly overruled.
100. The right to procreate was initially recognized in dicta in Skinner v. Okl. ex rel Williamson, though
it was not fully developed until Roe v. Wade, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
101. See, e.g., Sterilization of America, supra note 98; Edwin Black, Hitler's Debt to America, THE
GUARDIAN, Feb. 6, 2004, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2004/feb/06/race.usa (on file with the
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Court in Skinner v. Oklahoma recognized procreation as a fundamental right,
albeit in dicta.10
In later cases where the Court aimed to define fundamental rights protected
by substantive due process, it heartily endorsed Skinner's dicta recognizing a
fundamental right to procreate. While procedural due process rights are
explicitly stated in the Fourteenth Amendment, substantive due process rights are
not.'" Even though the justices of the Supreme Court do not always agree
whether substantive due process rights exist, the Court has stated that substantive
due process differs from procedural protections because the Fourteenth
Amendment "bar[s] certain governmental actions regardless of the fairness of the
procedures used to implement them."'o
The Supreme Court has held that the procreative rights of minors can
outweigh the parents' interest in acting as the child's medical decision-maker.'06
In Roe v. Wade, the Court guaranteed a woman's right to privacy, as applied to
procreative rights.' 7 Roe also declared that a state infringement on procreative
freedom is subject to strict scrutiny analysis.0 s In Thornburgh v. American
McGeorge Law Review) (describing a new book detailing the connection between Hitler and American
eugenics); STEFAN KOHL, THE NAZI CONNECTION: EUGENICS, AMERICAN RACISM, AND GERMAN NATIONAL
SOCIALISM (1994) (noting that American eugenic laws influenced the Nazi program of "racial hygiene" and that
many American scientists supported Hitler's eugenic policies). For more on a modern return to eugenics, see
Tiesha Rashon Peal, The Continuing Sterilization of Undesirables in America, 6 RUTGERS RACE & L. REv. 225
(2004) (detailing the resurgence of the coerced sterilization of social "undesirables," including drug addicts and
alcoholics).
102. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541 ("There is no redemption for the individual whom the [sterilization] law
touches. Any experiment which the State conducts is to his irreparable injury. He is forever deprived of a basic
liberty."). However, rather than relying on due process, the Court decided the issue as a deprivation of equal
protection of the law because of the arbitrary line drawn between the types of criminals sterilized. Id.
103. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) ("We deal with a right of privacy
older than the Bill of Rights-older than our political parties, older than our school system. Marriage is a
coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred.");
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849 (1992) ("[T]he Constitution places limits
on a State's right to interfere with a person's most basic decisions about family and parenthood . . . as well as
bodily integrity."); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 560 (2003) ("[llndividual decisions concerning the
intimacies of physical relationships, even when not intended to produce offspring, are a form of 'liberty'
protected by due process.").
104. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I.
105. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986); Casey, 505 U.S. at 846 (quoting Daniels v.
Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986)); see Gibbs, supra note 100 ("Just because autonomy doesn't show up on
an X-ray doesn't mean it can't be harmed by a scalpel. And if rights are inalienable, they exist whether the
patient is aware of them or not.").
106. See Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (upholding a Pennsylvania statute requiring parental notification before a
minor's abortion but allowing an alternative judicial approval process without parental consent); Planned
Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) ("Just as with the requirement of consent from the
spouse, so here, the State does not have the constitutional authority to give a third party an absolute, and
possible arbitrary, veto over the decision of the physician and his patient to terminate the patient's pregnancy,
regardless of the reason for withholding the consent.").
107. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
108. Id. at 155.
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College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, the Court further supported a
woman's rights to bodily integrity and self-determination.'" Memorably, the
Court noted that in the procreative context, there is a "moral fact that a person
belongs to himself and not to others nor to society as a whole.""o While the
Thornburgh court addressed the marital relationship, this principal arguably
applies within the parent/child relationship"' where a parent's decision to remove
his or her child's internal reproductive organs would also sterilize the child,
regardless of whether a secondary purpose also exists. Doctors often call these
surgeries "secondary sterilizations" and treat the sterilization as an undesirable
side effect. However, the intent of the surgery should not matter since the act of
sterilization itself is the constitutional violation.
The most recent controversy to raise these issues is the 2004 case of Ashley
X. Ashley has severe mental and physical disabilities of unknown origin, and
doctors predict she will never develop past the mental age of a young infant." 2
When Ashley was six, her parents sought a hysterectomy for her to prevent
menstruation, removal of her breast buds to prevent future breast growth, and
growth attenuation therapy to keep her small enough to easily care for at home."'
While Ashley's physicians agreed with her parents' wishes, they sought the
opinion of the hospital's ethics committee. "4 The committee decided that these
interventions were ethical, but advised the parents to seek judicial approval."
However, the parents did not do so."6
109. Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1985).
110. Id. at 777 n.5 (Stevens, J., concurring).
111. Legal scholars continue to debate the proper characterization of the parent/child legal relationship,
and different areas of the law tend to use different models. For more information on the varying models of the
parent/child relationship, see Ouellette, Shaping, supra note 48, at 985-91.
112. Alicia Ouellette, Growth Attenuation, Parental Choice, and the Rights of Disabled Children:
Lessons from the Ashley X Case, 8 Hous. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 207, 211-12 (2008) [hereinafter Ouellette,
Lessons from Ashley X]; Gibbs, supra note 100 ("'Ashley's smaller and lighter size,' her parents write on the
blog defending their decision, 'makes it more possible to include her in the typical family life and activities that
provide her with needed comfort, closeness, security and love: meal time, car trips, touch, snuggles, etc.' They
stress that the goal was 'to improve our daughter's quality of life and not to convenience her caregivers."'). But
see Shaping, supra note 48, at 983.
Ashley's parents stunted her growth and removed her organs to improve their own lives by creating
a child who was, in effect, easier to operate than the one to which they gave birth. . . . Children are
not cars. They are not kitchens. They are not a parental possession to be crafted. Children are
persons who should not be treated as objects of design or instruments of ambition. Objectifying
children denies their personhood and subordinates their present and future interests. Parental
overreaching is especially troubling in the health-care context because the impact on the child's
bodily integrity is immediate and irrevocable.
Id.
113. Ouellette, Lessons from Ashley X, supra note 113, at 210.
114. Id. at 212-13.
115. Id. at 214.
116. Id. ("Having received the blessing of the Committee, the treatment was implemented without
judicial or further review.").
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After Ashley's doctors performed the requested procedures in her home state
of Washington,"' disability activists were outraged and raised public awareness
for Ashley's case."' Today, Ashley's doctors admit they should have sought
judicial approval before they performed her hysterectomy, if nothing else."
Washington State already required judicial approval for the sterilization of the
mentally disabled.120
Children have some rights that cannot be exercised until an older age.12' For
instance, all Americans are constitutionally guaranteed the right to vote as a
method of participating in American democracy, but may not do so until the age
of 18.122 However, the government may not take away the right to vote so long as
it takes the right away before the child reaches the age of 18. This latent right to
vote exists, even though it cannot be readily exercised. As another example, a
child is not legally competent to marry, but the child's right to choose a spouse
upon attaining the age of consent cannot be infringed by parents "irrevocably
[betrothing the child] to someone."' Likewise, parents cannot force a child to
marry, even if state law permits the teen to marry with parental consent.124
Similarly, a young child has the right to procreate, even though he or she may not
yet be physically capable of doing so. While constitutional law limits a parent's
ability to force or deny an abortion, it does not currently forbid parents from
preventing procreation in the first place by removing the reproductive organs.
V. THE CALIFORNIA APPROACH TO STERILIZATION
In contrast to the lack of federal guidelines, section 1958 of the California
Probate Code, and other related California statutes, provide individuals with
mental disabilities all three of the procedural protections mentioned by the Court,
in addition to others.125 When a mentally disabled individual's parent (or guardian
117. Doctors also removed Ashley's appendix as a preventative measure for fear that Ashley would not
be able to inform her parents of the abdominal pain that precedes the bursting of an appendix. The "Ashley
Treatment": Towards a Better Quality of Life for "Pillow Angels," http://ashleytreatment.spaces.live.com/ (last
visited Mar. 29, 2010) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); Ouellette, Lessons from Ashley X, supra note
113, at 215.
118. Ouellette, Lessons from Ashley X, supra note 113, at 217-21.
119. Carol M. Ostrom, Children's Hospital Says It Should Have Gone to Court in Case of Disabled 6-
year-old, SEATTLE TIMES, May 8, 2007.
120. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.92.043(5) (2007).
121. See Joel Feinberg, The Child's Right to an Open Future, in WHOSE CHILD? CHILDREN'S RIGHTS,
PARENTAL AUTHORITY, AND STATE POWER 125-26 (William Aiken & Hugh LaFollette, eds., 1980) (arguing
for a recognition of "rights-in-trust," which must be "saved for the child until he is an adult") (emphasis in
original).
122. U.S. CONsT. amend. XXVI, § I ("The right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen years
of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of age.").
123. Ouellette, Shaping, supra note 48, at 989.
124. Id.
125. In 1985, California led the world in the forced sterilization of convicted criminals, the mentally ill,
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or conservator) feels that sterilization is in the patient's best interest, the
California Legislature has provided for a neutral third-party approval process.126
This process is a natural alternative to the parental informed consent required for
the removal of reproductive organs in childhood DSD surgery.
A. When Is an Individual with Mental Disabilities Able to Consent to
Sterilization?
The ability of an individual with mental disabilities to consent to sterilization
is defined by statute. In California, the average sterilization patient must consent
voluntarily and fully understand the nature and consequences of sterilization.1'
Anyone capable of consenting to sterilization (or potentially able to consent in
the future) cannot be sterilized with substituted consent under the procedures
outlined below.128  Consent is determined by whether the individual fully
understands the nature and consequences of sterilization.129
Because procreation is a personal right and choice, 30 courts do not allow
another person to consent to sterilization on behalf of a temporarily incapacitated
patient."' California law requires that the patient's "incapacity is in all likelihood
permanent." 32 If medical evidence suggests that the patient may eventually
develop the ability to consent to medical treatment, courts have shown a
willingness to protect the patient's ability to choose his or her own medical care.
and the disabled. See In re Conservatorship of Valerie N., 40 Cal.3d 143 (1985) (finding that California statutes
that prohibited anyone from consenting to the sterilization of the mentally disabled deprived these individuals of
their right to privacy and liberty, specifically by not allowing females with mental disabilities to have the same
procreative right to sterilization as other females). Notably, in the earliest stages of sterilization law, the goal
was to "asexualize" a prison or mental institution inmate, which was extended to the mentally disabled in 1917.
Id. at 151. See Stats. 1909, ch. 720, § 1, pp. 1093-94 ("[I]f in their opinion, or in the opinion of any two of
them, asexualization will be beneficial to such inmate, patient, or convict, they may perform the same . . . .").
California, "a pioneer in the field," performed nearly eighty percent of the statutory sterilizations in the United
States during the years 1907-1921. Valerie N., 40 Cal.3d at 151-52. "Although challenged on a variety of
constitutional grounds, principally denial of due process and equal protection, most of these statutes were
upheld, if adequate procedural safeguards, including a hearing for the patient, were afforded." Id.
126. The Supreme Court of California has consistently held that the freedom from sterilization is
encompassed within the California Constitution's explicit right to privacy. See Valerie N., 40 Cal.3d at 148
("[T]he present statutory scheme denies incompetent developmentally disabled persons rights which are
accorded all other persons in violation of state and federal constitutional guarantees of privacy."); Id. at 162
("The interests of the incompetent which mandate recognition of procreative choice as an aspect of the
fundamental right to privacy and liberty do not differ from the interests of women able to give voluntary
consent to this procedure.").
127. CAL. PROB. CODE § 1951 (2009).
128. Id. § 1951(a).
129. Id. § 1951(b)(3).
130. Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 777 n.5 (1985).
131. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 1958.
132. Id.
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To date, the Supreme Court has been unwilling to extend to parents a veto over
their child's procreative choices."3
When a patient cannot consent to necessary or beneficial medical care,
however, this right may be delegated to another in order to secure treatment.'
Otherwise, the patient would remain untreated indefinitely. Interestingly, in order
to allow substituted consent, California law implicitly requires that an individual
with mental disabilities must have reached the age of majority.' This minimum
age requirement suggests that the Legislature sought to ensure that the patient is
permanently unable to consent to medical treatment, particularly since the
procreative "risks" 3 6 may exist as much as a decade before this minimum age.
Notably, one California statute provides that no institutionalized minor may
be sterilized.' The presumed legislative intent of this statute is that the
sterilization decision is one that is better left to an adult to make for him- or
herself. On the other hand, in the case of intersex children, parents and doctors
generally contend that early surgical intervention (before school age) is beneficial
because they hope to give children "normal" childhoods-a benefit that would be
lost by waiting until the child reaches the age of consent.' Other articles'3 9
maintain, however, that these contentions are based upon false assumptions, such
as the fact that American schools have almost universally abandoned the "gym
class changing room/shower" scene that plagues the minds of these doctors and
popular society.'4 The question then becomes whether a "normal childhood"
outweighs the constitutional rights of the child.
B. The Substantive Due Process Protections for an Adult with Mental
Disabilities Facing Sterilization
To secure judicial approval for the sterilization of an individual with mental
disabilities, the court must make several findings beyond a reasonable doubt.'4'
133. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
134. Beh & Diamond, supra note 25, at 37-38.
135. The statutes exclusively refer to the conservator/conservatee relationship, not the guardian/ward
relationship. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 2105(c) ("If there are two appointed conservators, both must agree to
the treatment; if there are more than two appointed conservators, a majority of the conservators must agree.").
Per other statutory provisions, the conservator/conservatee relationship may only begin at the age of majority.
Id. § 1820(b) ("If the proposed conservatee is a minor, the petition may be filed during his or her minority so
that the appointment of a conservator may be made effective immediately upon the minor's attaining the age of
majority.").
136. Namely, pregnancy.
137. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 2356 (governing involuntary medication and institutionalization).
138. See, e.g., Anne Tamar-Mattis, What About the Locker Room?, ENDOCRINE TODAY, Mar. 1, 2009
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
139. See supra note 63 and accompanying text (sampling the articles that call for a moratorium on
childhood DSD surgeries).
140. Tamar-Mattis, What About the Locker Room?, supra note 139.
141. CAL. PROB. CODE § 1958.
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First, it must find that children with DSDs are unable to consent to medical
treatment. 42 Second, it must conclude that "reasonable medical evidence" shows
that the child is "fertile and capable of procreation." 43 Third, the court must make
a determination that the proposed surgery "entails the least invasion of the body
of the individual."'" Fourth, it must determine that the "current state of scientific
and medical knowledge does not suggest" that a less invasive or less permanent
solution will soon be available.145
Doctors may only provide the least invasive form of birth control or
sterilization that is medically and practicably possible.146 For example, California
law does not authorize a hysterectomy or castration as an acceptable method of
sterilization unless it is independently considered "a medically necessary
treatment."147 However, even if the procedure is considered medically necessary,
the conservator is still required to secure judicial approval to proceed with a
surgery to remove the uterus or gonads.148
One section of the California Probate Code explicitly removes the
protections for surgeries in which sterilization may result as a side effect. The
section states, "[t]his chapter does not prohibit medical treatment or surgery
required for other medical reasons and in which sterilization is an unavoidable or
medically probable consequence, but is not the object of the treatment or
surgery." 49 In this case, the Legislature appears to recognize that when overall
health is involved, the right to procreate may be compromised. While medically
necessary treatment should override the right to procreate, several scholars argue
that the prompt sterilization of a child is generally not medically necessary or
even medically indicated for psychological or physical reasons. "o
C. The Procedural Due Process Protections for an Adult with Mental
Disabilities Facing Sterilization
The California Legislature has enacted extensive and mandatory procedures
to protect those unable to personally consent to medical care.'5 ' If a court grants a
142. Id. § 1958(a).
143. Id. § 1958(b).
144. Id. § 1958(f).
145. Id. § 1958(g)(1).
146. Id. § 1958(f).
147. Id. § 1961 (2009).
148. Id. Gonads include both testes and ovaries. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 737 (26th ed.
1995). Arguably, it would also include ovotestes, which are reproductive organs that produce both sperm and
eggs. Id. at 1275.
149. CAL. PROB. CODE § 1967.
150. See supra note 63 (citing authors who argue that DSD surgeries are not medically necessary or
indicated, and therefore, courts and practitioners should impose a moratorium on the procedures).
151. California's statutory procedural protections include: (1) independent representation of the
conservatee with the presumption that the conservatee would oppose sterilization, CAL. PROB. CODE § 1954
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sterilization request, the judge must issue a written decision of the factual and
legal conclusions for each finding required by statute. 5 2 Regardless, the order for
sterilization is automatically appealed without any action by the patient.13
Furthermore, these appeals take precedence over other cases in the court of
appeal.154 Until the final determination on appeal is made, the sterilization order is
stayed.5 If upheld on appeal, the sterilization procedure must be performed
within one year or the order expires. 1 If all the findings required by section 1958
have not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the petition can be re-filed only
upon a showing of a material change in circumstances.'
VI. How COURTS IN OTHER COUNTRIES HAVE ADDRESSED THE STERILIZATION
OF CHILDREN
While no on-point American case law exists dealing with the removal of the
reproductive organs of intersex children, a look to other jurisdictions may
provide insight on how the Supreme Court of the United States might approach
such a case. The Court has shown some willingness to consider foreign law when
determining which activities constitute fundamental rights requiring
Constitutional protection.'" Both the United Kingdom and Australia have
considered the issue of sterilizing minor children, and both nations have a similar
jurisprudential foundation and Anglo-American concept of fundamental rights.
While foreign judgments are never dispositive, the Supreme Court would likely
afford them considerable weight.
(2009); (2) an investigation and written report from the regional center for the developmentally disabled, id. §
1955(a); (3) two examinations of the conservatee, including one by a psychologist or clinical social worker, id.
§ 1955(b); (4) the examiners should only recommend sterilization if there is no suitable alternative, id. §
1955(c); (5) the presence of the conservatee is required at the hearing except for "medical inability" or if
attending the hearing is likely to cause "serious and immediate physiological damage" to the conservatee, id. §
1956; (6) a written decision by the judge; (7) an automatic appeal if sterilization is authorized, id. § 1962(a); (8)
the appeal has automatic precedence over "over other cases in the court in which the appeal is pending," id. §
1962(b); (9) a stay on the procedure until the order is upheld on appeal, id. § 1962(b); and (10) an automatic
expiration date for the court order, after which a new approval must be secured if the procedure is delayed for
whatever reason, id. § 1965.
152. Id. § 1962(a).
153. Id. § 1962(b).
154. Id.
155. Id. § 1965.
156. Id. § 1964.
157. Id. § 1966. If the petition for sterilization is granted, the doctor's and conservator's legal liability is
limited to negligence or willful misconduct. Id.
158. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (finding persuasive both English law and the European Court
of Human Rights); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002) (considering "consistency" between legislative
evidence and foreign law in order to determine whether there is "a consensus among those who have addressed
the issue.") The Court also quotes Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830, 831 n.31 (2002), which found
the laws of other Anglo-American nations worth considering. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316.
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In 1986, the British House of Lords'" ruled that no person could give consent
for any sterilization procedure'60 on behalf of a mentally disabled minor, but did
not speak of parents specifically. 6' However, one Lord explicitly stated that
sterilization was "outside the scope of parental power" and should only be
decided by a judge.162 Like the United States, the United Kingdom recognizes the
right to procreate as a basic human right. 163
In 1993, the High Court of Australia, considered whether parents could
consent to the removal of their mentally disabled daughter's uterus and ovaries.'6
In exceeding the parameters of the case at bar, the Court held that parents must
seek judicial approval from the Family Court for any and all proposed
sterilizations of minor children unless the sterilization is incidental to an
exceptional case, such as a life-threatening illness.6 1
The Court began its analysis by recognizing the right to bodily integrity for
all, including children,'" and admonishing that the best interests of a child are a
limit on parental power.'16  The Court was particularly concerned that parents and
doctors may underestimate the child's "present or future capacity to consent" to
medical treatment.'6  Interestingly, the Court declined to assume that the
sterilization was a "medical treatment," and found instead that "it is the very fact
that sterilization implies more than medical, or surgical, treatment that is
159. The British House of Lords is not a traditional court, but the upper house of the Parliament. See
House of Lords, http://www.parliament.uk/business/lords/ (last visited May 11, 2011) (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
160. The court did not distinguish between procedures with sterilization as the primary purpose or as an
unavoidable side-effect, and it is unclear whether the court intended such a distinction. Secretary, Department of
Health & Community Services v. JWB & Anor, (1992) 175 C.L.R. 218, 245 (Austl.) [hereinafter Marion's
Case].
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Marion's Case, supra note 160 (finding that parents could not obtain a hysterectomy and
ovariectomy for their fourteen-year-old daughter with severe mental and physical disabilities. However, the
court did not reach the issue of whether the sterilization procedures were in the patient's best interests).
165. Id. at 249-50; see Karen Gumy, Sex and The Surgeon's Knife: The Family Court's Dilemma ...
Informed Consent and the Specter of latrogenic Harm to Children With Intersex Characteristics, 33 AM. J.L. &
MED. 625, 636-39 (2007).
166. Marion's Case, supra note 160, at 233.
167. Id. at 240. For instance, the Australian court noted that parents may not cut off their child's foot in
order to earn money begging because it is "inconceivable" that this decision is in the best interest of the child.
Id. As noted in Part IH, the Supreme Court of the United States has also recognized children's right to bodily
integrity. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849 (1992) ("[Tjhe Constitution
places limits on a State's right to interfere with a person's most basic decisions about family and parenthood ...
as well as bodily integrity . . . ." (internal citations omitted)); see also Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976); Prince v. Mass., 321 U.S. 158, 167 (1944) ("The state has a wide range of
power for limiting parental freedom and authority in things affecting the child's welfare, and such power
includes to some extent matters of conscience and religious conviction."). This is the principle behind American
courts' exceptions to the parental informed consent presumption. See supra Part M.
168. Marion's Case, supra note 160, at 250.
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crucial ... ."'69 Indeed, the removal of reproductive organs reaches far beyond the
DSD treatment itself and can affect the child's adulthood in irreparable ways."o
Two years after the Australian case, Colombia's Constitutional Court
confronted its own "John/Joan case" and held that parents cannot consent to
genital "correction" at all."' Colombia's Court found that intersex children are a
minority suffering from discrimination and that "[s]urgery may actually be a
violation of autonomy and bodily integrity, motivated by parents' intolerance of
their own children's sexual difference." 72 Like the United States, Colombia has a
legal presumption that parents act in the best interest of their children in medical
matters; however, the Colombia Court noted that parents may make the decision
to "correct" their child's genitals based on their own fears rather than on the best
interests of the child.'"
International courts that have examined whether a parent can consent to
sterilization on behalf of a minor have consistently found that the right to consent
to this form of medical care is beyond the scope of parental power. Because these
countries recognize a right to procreation and bodily integrity similar to those
recognized by the United States Supreme Court, United States courts would
likely come to a similar conclusion if faced with similar facts.
VII. ARGUMENT
As with individuals with mental disabilities, surgeries that remove the
reproductive organs of children with DSDs impact several of their fundamental
liberties. Therefore, due process procedural protections are likely necessary
under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
To date, there are no known cases in the United States of litigation to prevent
the "gender normalization surgery" of a child with a DSD, or of an adult
litigating over childhood harms. However, there is a growing community of
intersex individuals seeking answers and apologies for the "medical treatments"
169. Id. at 232.
170. For example, reduced sexual function and sensitivity. See Tamar-Mattis, Exceptions to the Rule,
supra note 18, at 69-70 ("Many intersex people who have undergone surgery report inability to orgasm, chronic
pain, and insensitivity caused by scar tissue-problems which can cause a lifetime of sexual impairment.");
Ehrenreich & Barr, supra note 63 at 105-14 ("[Slome long-term follow-up studies of intersex surgery have
found a documented failure rate for sexual sensation of twenty to thirty percent. At a minimum, the reduced
skin sensitivity that can result from scarring of both the clitoris and the (usually reconstructed) vagina seems
likely to impair sexual enjoyment for many people.").
171. Julie A. Greenberg & Cheryl Chase, Background of Colombia Decisions, Intersex Society of North
America (last visited Mar. 29, 2010) [hereinafter Background of Colombia Decisions] (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review) (noting that the court held that parents were legally unable to consent to DSD surgery
on their child). No full English translation of the decision exists, though a few authors have translated portions
of the decision.
172. Id.
173. Id.
865
2011 /Reproductive Organs and Differences of Sex Development
they received as children. 7 4 Without existing precedent on-point, one must
analogize to other areas of the law. The judicial treatment of the sterilization of
individuals with mental disabilities may be particularly appropriate for
anticipating how a court would reason through a case with an intersex child. Each
state has approached this issue differently-some with legislation, some with
case law. Because California has a more formal system than many states,
consisting both of statutes and case law, it is a good place to look for an
alternative method for regulating the sterilization of intersex children.
Sterilization is the permanent removal of the reproductive organs. Rather
than make arbitrary distinctions without any medical training, this Comment
argues that doctors should avoid the removal of any reproductive organ, because
the permanent removal of reproductive potential implicates fundamental rights.
The fertility of children with DSDs is particularly difficult to define because their
bodies may have both male and female reproductive organs, either of them, or
they may lack them altogether. In some cases, the children may be assuredly
infertile or assuredly fertile with functioning reproductive organs. However,
many children fall somewhere in between."' A child with limited or unexpected
reproductive organs may be able to procreate with the assistance of current or
future medical technology, but no one can predict what medical technology will
be available in twenty or thirty years, precisely at the age when these children
will likely seek to have children of their own.'7 ' Therefore, sterilization, not the
removal of fertility, should be the standard.
Although it is possible for any child with a DSD to be infertile, some
conditions have higher probabilities of infertility. For instance, female children
with Swyer Syndrome are infertile because they are born without any functional
gonads.'77 On the other end of the scale, children diagnosed with mircopenis
174. One such practice is medical display, which many liken to sexual abuse. During medical display,
intersex children are placed on exhibit for medical students. Ehrenreich & Barr, supra note 63, at 105-10.
175. Determining when and if a child is fertile is beyond the scope of this Comment, but "fertility" is not
the issue; sterilization is. Further, it is beyond the scope of this Comment to determine which situations merit
court intervention. While a variety of medical conditions exist, it is possible to generalize about many of the
most common conditions. Doing so will allow courts to develop a framework to provide guidance in instances
where more unusual conditions are presented.
176. For instance, children born with androgen insensitivity syndrome (AIS) have either undescended or
partially descended testes. Future medical advances may allow for these testes to be fertile. Currently, children
with AIS are considered infertile, however future medical advances may allow these testes to become fertile.
Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome, http://www.isna.org/faq/conditions/ais (last visited Mar. 29, 2010) (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review). As another example, children with Turner's Syndrome have non-functioning
ovaries but a normal uterus and vagina. These women are able to have a normal pregnancy and vaginal
childbirth with a donated egg, but related cardiac issues may counsel against pregnancy. The Turner Syndrome
Society, Turner Syndrome-The Basics, http://www.tumersyndrome.org/index.php?option=com_content
&task=view&id=40&Itemid=63 (last visited Mar. 29, 2010) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
177. Intersex Society of North America, Swyer's Syndrome, http://www.isna.org/faq/conditions/swyer
(last visited Mar. 29, 2010) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
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generally have functional male genitals.7 1 While XX children born with
Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) are sometimes assigned a male gender,
they often still have potentially fertile female internal reproductive organs."
Whether or not actual fertility is at stake, a person still may not constitutionally
consent to sterilization on behalf of another, even if that other is his or her minor
child.8 o
Because sterilization surgeries implicate a mentally disabled individual's
fundamental rights by violating his or her bodily integrity and autonomy,
procedural protections are usually constitutionally guaranteed by the states.'
Similarly, DSD surgeries regularly take away the autonomy and procreative
potential of children. 8 2 These procedural due process protections for the mentally
disabled are procedures that ensure that the patient has notice and the opportunity
to protect his or her liberties'-protections that intersex children currently do
not enjoy.
Doctors should pursue judicial approval for the surgical removal of
reproductive organs using an approach substantially similar to California's
system for the sterilization of individuals with mental disabilities. California law
requires that a probate court take several steps before the court can approve a
procedure that will result in sterilization, '8 presumably in order to protect (1) the
patient's right to bodily integrity, (2) the patient's right to privacy, (3) the
178. See Justine M. Reilly & C.R.J. Woodhouse, Small Penis and the Male Sexual Role, 142 J. OF
UROLOGY 569 (1989) (publishing data on the fertility of men with micropenis who were allowed to retain their
testes).
179. The Hormone Foundation, Hormones & You: Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia, Feb. 2010,
available at http://www.hormone.org/Resources/upload/congenital-adrenal-hyperplasia-020410.pdf (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review). The male teenager mentioned in the Introduction to this Comment is most
likely a XX child with CAH and a male gender.
180. As noted in the Introduction, "Fertility is inherently speculative even when a person possesses all
the 'correct' reproductive organs, while sterilization is the removal of the reproductive organs."
181. See, e.g., In re Grady, 426 A.2d 467 (N.J. 1981) (finding that New Jersey law requires a judicial
hearing to allow parents to consent to the sterilization of their mentally disabled daughter and requiring clear
and convincing proof that the sterilization is in the best interest of the patient); A.L. v. G.R.H., 325 N.E.2d 501
(Ind. 1975) (finding that the common law does not authorize a parent to sterilize her brain-damaged child); In re
M.K.R., 515 S.W.2d 467 (Mo. 1974) (finding that even the courts did not have jurisdiction to approve a
parent's request to sterilize a child with mental disabilities without express statutory approval); Ruby v. Massey,
452 F. Supp. 361, 366 (D. Conn. 1978) (finding that parents "may neither veto nor give valid consent to the
sterilization of their children"); In re Guardianship of Hayes, 608 P.2d 635 (Wash. 1980) (finding that a parent
cannot consent to the sterilization of a child with mental disabilities and that there is a "heavy presumption"
against sterilization); and In re Moe, 432 N.E.2d 712 (Mass. 1982) (finding that individuals with mental
disabilities enjoy the same constitutional right to privacy and procreation as any other individual; however, this
finding allowed the court jurisdiction to entertain parental requests for the sterilization of their children).
182. See, e.g., Tamar-Mattis, Exceptions to the Rule, supra note 18, at 92 (noting that "intersex people[]
are declaring the right of intersex children to control their own destiny in this most intimate and personal of
areas.").
183. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 1958 (providing procedural due process protections to California's
individuals with mental disabilities).
184. Id.
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patient's right to procreate, and (4) the patient's right to autonomy. Children with
DSDs have substantially similar constitutional concerns, and a substantially
similar process is likely to protect those concerns as it has for decades in the
mentally disabled community.
A. The Sterilization of Children with DSDs Raises the Same Policy Concerns as
the Sterilization of the Mentally Disabled
1. The Fundamental Right to Procreate and Other Constitutional Concerns
Like individuals with mental disabilities, children with DSDs should, at a
minimum, enjoy procedural due process protections before having their
reproductive organs removed without their personal consent. However,
procedural protections alone may not be sufficient to pass due process muster.
British and Colombian courts have found that parents cannot consent to the
removal of a child's reproductive organs, even with judicial approval.'8 6
Similarly, American courts may find that these children's fundamental rights are
so important that even procedural protections cannot justify allowing substituted
consent when the child may one day be capable of consent personally. "If the
right [to procreate] means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or
single to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a
child." 8 7 However, this proposal suggests governmental intrusion into the parent-
child relationship, where courts have presumed that a parent acts in the best
interest of the child. On the other hand, courts have been hesitant about a parent's
ability to consider the child's best interest when the child's reproductive interests
are on the line."'
The latent right to procreate should be judicially protected on behalf of the
child and the interest in protecting his or her autonomy in making personal
decisions in the future. "Children are not legally capable of defending their own
185. The sterilization issue is hotly debated in the mentally disabled community. See, e.g., James C.
Dugan, Note, The Conflict Between "Disabling" and "Enabling" Paradigms in Law: Sterilization, the
Developmentally Disabled, and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 507 (1993)
(arguing that the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 should mandate "maximally protective sterilization
statutes"); Elizabeth S. Scott, Sterilization of Mentally Retarded Persons: Reproductive Rights and Family
Privacy, 1986 DUKE L.J. 806 (1986) (arguing against the traditional and paternalistic model of sterilization law
as applied to the mentally disabled); Maura McIntyre, Note, Buck v. Bell and Beyond: A Revised Standard to
Evaluate the Best Interests of the Mentally Disabled in the Sterilization Context, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 1303
(2007) (detailing the inconsistent and unjust sterilization approval procedures used throughout the United States
and proposing a "revised best interest" standard).
186. Marion's Case, supra note 161; Background of Colombia Decisions, supra note 171.
187. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
188. Supra section IH.A.
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future interest against present infringement by their parents, so that task must be
performed for them [by the Statej."'"
2. The Inability to Consent
California law expressly requires that the patient's inability to consent to a
medical procedure must be permanent in order for him or her to forfeit that
right,'" which is almost never the case with the average DSD patient. While the
legislative goal was not spelled out, one could presume that this law was created
to allow a person with disabilities to delay a personal reproductive decision if
there is any chance that individual will eventually develop the capacity to decide
personally. Once it is determined that the individual will not gain capacity, the
individual will receive little benefit from delaying a procedure deemed
beneficial. In other words, parental or surrogate consent will be required for the
procedure either now or later, so why delay? In the DSD context, when the child
presumptively will gain capacity through the natural aging process, there is a
choice between surrogate consent and the individual's personal consent.
Therefore, it is likely that courts and legislatures would prefer to delay
sterilizations in cases when a child may eventually be capable of consenting to
the procedure.
3. Whether the Parents Have the Best Interests of the Child in Mind
No one wants to question the perceptions or motives of a parent. However, in
difficult medical situations, parents may not always be capable of considering
their child's needs before their own.'9 ' While this may be a rare situation, society
should be willing to inconvenience the many to protect such a fundamental right
of the few when a child's fundamental rights are involved. There is no way to
ascertain the unspoken thought process and emotional reactions of parents during
a doctor's procurement of consent, but all children with DSDs will benefit from
the due process protections of a judicial hearing process.
Like the Colombian Constitutional Court, some American scholars and
practitioners question the ability of parents to make the decision to pursue sex
organ surgery to treat a child with a DSD.192 One scholar, Anne Tamar-Mattis,
189. Feinberg, supra note 121, at 128.
190. CAL. PROB. CODE § 1958(a) (2009).
191. See, e.g., Guardianship of Phillip B., 188 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1st Dist. 1983) (finding that emotionally
detached parents are not in the best position to protect the best interests of the child).
192. See Tamar-Mattis, Exceptions to the Rule, supra note 18, at 89-90 (arguing for the adoption of a
judicial hearing for any genital surgery on a child unable to consent). Tamar-Mattis defines parental "conflict of
interest" by noting that "parents may be responding to multiple conscious or unconscious needs-the child's,
their own, other people's-that may make it confusing and difficult to weigh all aspects of this decision
objectively. This very confusion and pressure may make it tempting to opt for, and believe in, the 'magic wand'
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primarily focuses on fulfilling the psychological needs of the parents and argues
that "the decision to perform surgery may be centered more around the needs of
caregivers than the needs of the child."' 3 Tamar-Mattis highlights an important
contradiction: the foundation of the surgical treatment model is that the parents
will be alienated from a "different" child until and unless the surgery is
performed.'" However, potential parental alienation is the precise reason that
many courts doubt the parents' ability to consider the best interests of a healthy
child's organ donation or the purposeful sterilization of a mentally disabled
child.'95 Parents may also have difficulty protecting a child's future procreative
ability because of the discomfort of imagining their child as an adult with sexual
needs.'" Because of these concerns, the most important procedural protection for
children in the judicial hearing process is the appointment of a guardian ad litem
who must presume that the child would oppose the procedure. Without such
representation, the court could become a rubber stamp to a decision made by the
parent and doctors without meaningful neutral consideration."'
B. The Inability to Reinterpret the Existing Laws Governing the Sterilization of
Individuals with Mental Disabilities to Extend the Protections to Intersex
Children
It would be difficult to simply reinterpret existing law to apply to children
with DSDs because current law contemplates that the mentally disabled are
permanently unable to consent. Put simply, if a state regulates the sterilization of
the mentally disabled, its laws are usually expressly limited to that portion of the
population and to medical treatments with the primary purpose of sterilization.
However, it is possible to read the statutes more broadly as recognizing that
procreation is a fundamental right and as a result, the permanent removal of
fertility is an extraordinary procedure that falls outside the scope of the
parental/surrogate consent presumptions.
of surgery, so they can get on with loving and nurturing their baby." Id. at 89 n.216.
193. Id. at 89.
194. Id. at 89-90.
195. Id. See supra note 188 and accompanying text (describing the parents' potential conflict of interest
that could cloud their ability to make treatment decisions for a child with a DSD).
196. Tamar-Mattis, Exceptions to the Rule, supra note 18, at 83-84 ("Parents may be hampered in
making decisions that affect their child's adult sexual life because they may be uncomfortable thinking about
the child as a sexual or potentially sexual being.").
197. Id. at 104 ("As in the case of child sterilization or organ donations, this representative should be
charged with arguing vigorously against the proposed surgery in order to assure a meaningful adversarial
process.").
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In the DSD context, sterilization is rarely the stated purpose of surgery.'
However, the procedures do necessarily sterilize the child by removing his or her
reproductive organs.
C. Why Judicial Review Is Better than Parental Informed Consent
The judicial hearing process protects children by ensuring that their
reproductive organs are removed only when a neutral decision-maker confirms
that it is in their best interest. While surgeries without the child's personal
consent may qualify as child abuse in the most literal sense, " "the interventions
are presumed to be in the children's best interests because parents and doctors are
involved." 20 However, removing a child's reproductive organs can have far-
reaching effects on the child's adulthood. As noted by Tamar-Mattis, allowing
the informed consent model to continue would "carry the implication that it
would be acceptable for parents to authorize the surgery for any reason-
parental discomfort, embarrassment over raising a son with a small penis or a
daughter with a noticeable clitoris, desire for one gender or another-as long as
they were fully informed of the risks."20 1 Many of the potential reasons behind a
parent's informed consent to DSD treatment do not outweigh the child's
fundamental rights, and the judicial hearing process provides the proper
procedural and substantive protections to assure that those rights are safeguarded.
As. noted by the Colombian Constitutional Court, parents may be unknowingly
acting upon their own fears or intolerance.2 02
VIII. CONCLUSION
Surgery to remove a child's reproductive organs currently affects his or her
fundamental rights without independent representation of what the child might
want if he or she were able to consent. This type of unilateral and fundamental
invasion of a child's bodily integrity is offensive to the American notion of due
198. See supra note 176 and accompanying text and Introduction ("Whether or not these surgeons intend
to do so, they are, in effect, sterilizing the child when they elect to remove his or her reproductive organs. This
election should be considered independently of the child's actual or predicted fertility.").
199. See Child Welfare Information Gateway, What Is Child Abuse and Neglect?, Apr. 2008,
http://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/factssheets/whatiscan.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Lw Review) (defining
abuse as inflicting a "physical injury (ranging from minor bruises to severe fractures or death) as a result of
punching, beating, kicking, biting, shaking, throwing, stabbing, choking, hitting (with a hand, stick, strap, or
other object), burning, or otherwise harming a child . . . ," regardless of parental intent); David, I Am Not
Alone!, in HERMAPHRODITES WITH ATTITUDES, I INSA 1, 5 (Cheryl Chase ed., 1995), available at
http://www.isna.org/files/hwa/winter l995.pdf ("What is done to these children, what was done to me, is legally
and scientifically sanctioned traumatic sexual abuse.").
200. Ouellette, Shaping, supra note 48, at 973.
201. Tamar-Mattis, Exceptions to the Rule, supra note 18, at 88.
202. Background of Colombia Decisions, supra note 171.
871
2011 /Reproductive Organs and Differences of Sex Development
process, but can be sufficiently protected by a simple judicial process that has
already proven workable in the mentally disabled community.
While the government should not interfere with the right to parent one's
child, which includes the right to make most medical decisions, the government
should step in when the rights of the child outweigh those of the parent.
203Governments already do this through child protective services, child labor
laws,204 and school enrollment requirements.20s When a child's fundamental rights
are at risk, the parent's wishes to have the child's reproductive organs removed
should give way to the child's rights. Given time, the child can manifest
informed consent independently if he or she chooses to pursue the proposed
treatment.
203. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 601-02 (1979) ("[W]e have recognized that a state is not
without constitutional control over parental discretion in dealing with children when their physical or mental
health is jeopardized.").
204. Federal Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 212 (2009).
205. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925).
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